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L INTRODUCTION 
The central purpose of Thiessen's book is to defend religious nurture and 
instruction against he charge of indoctrination. In doing so he questions the pre- 
vailing ideal of liberal education which tmderlies the charge of religious indoc- 
trination. But Thiessen's ambition reaches even farther: he also wants to sketch 
the outlines of a new ideal of liberal education, in the extension of which a 
redefinition of indoctrination can be presented. From the beginning the author is 
quite explicit about his own commitment: "My roots are Christian; I was raised 
in a Mennonite home . . "  (p. xii). And he also makes clear that his analyses 
should be placed "within the context of a fairly conservative interpretation of
Christian doctrine" (p. 29; see also: p. 55). 
In Thiessen's opinion the method of conceptual nalysis is less suitable for his 
inquiry: "I wish to move beyond the sometimes narrow and seemingly futile pre- 
occupation with conceptual clarification . . "  (p. 5). Terms ought to be under- 
stood in their historical context (p. 33), and Thiessen considers it "more appropriate 
to aim for a 'theory of indoctrination', rather than an analysis of the concept of 
indoctrination" (p. 232). On the basis of prevailing descriptive analyses of this 
term, Thiessen presents a rescriptive inquiry of indoctrination a d liberal education. 
The driving force of a rescriptive inquiry is a kind of intellectual discontentment 
with existing (configurations of) central concepts, and the product of such a 
rescription has to be more adequate from a theoretical viewpoint han certain 
current (frameworks of) central educational concepts (Steutel, 1988). Later I will 
answer the question whether Thiessen has succeeded in this undertaking. 
2. RELIGIOUS INDOCTRINATION AND LIBERAL EDUCATION 
In the first chapter Thiessen explores the different forms of the charge of reli- 
gious indoctrination and the alternative approaches to avoid this reproach. 
Religious indoctrination, according to Thiessen, is largely a phantom of our 
liberal minds. This 'modern ghost' was created mainly by analytic philosophers, 
like Peters, Hirst, Wilson and Hare. The conclusion that can be drawn from their 
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analyses is that it is not teaching about religion but the teaching of  a specific 
religion that is indoctrinatory. 
Christian nurture or upbringing takes as its starting point the affirmation of 
Christian truth and further seeks to foster belief as well as commitment (p. 27). 
The central question of Thiessen's book is: Does Christian nurture or the con- 
fessional approach to religious education involve indoctrination? The following 
approach is taken: instead of (re-)defining 'indoctrination' in order to decide 
whether Christian nurture falls under the concept of indoctrination, it is exam- 
ined whether the methods, content, aims, and consequences of Christian nurture 
are morally and educationally acceptable. The mentioned criteria are the logical 
condition of 'indoctrination' that philosophers have identified in their analyses. 
The concern about and charge of indoctrination arises of the context of the 
Enlightenment ideal of liberal education. According to Thiessen, an examination 
of the underlying values and assumptions of this ideal should help to understand 
the charge of indoctrination. From the perspective of this ideal, described by 
Richard Peters, religious upbringing turns out to be too narrow, it fails to stimu- 
late an open, rational, and critical exploration of other ways of experience. It dis- 
courages critical thinking and hampers the development of autonomy. According 
to Thiessen, one assumption that underlies the modern conception of liberal edu- 
cation needs special attention: liberal education has acquired a secular meaning. 
In this connection I want to raise the question whether liberal education is hostile 
to religious or Christian upbringing per se, or only to specific forms of religious 
or Christian nurture. Though he acknowledges that Christianity is not all of one 
piece (p. 29), throughout his study Thiessen speaks about Christian parents or 
educators and the Christian faith, whereas in relation to the charge of indoctrina- 
tion it surely matters whether the parents are members of Opus Dei (a secretive 
ultra-orthodox organization within the Roman Catholic Church) or consider 
themselves as (liberal) Mainline Protestants. I will return to this subject, and 
more in particular to fundamentalism, later. 
Thiessen does not simply reject he liberal context: "While broadly accepting 
the ideal of liberal education, together with its underlying values and assump- 
tions, I want to subject all this to critical scrutiny, not with a view to discarding 
the ideal, but rather with a view to moving towards a more defensible and care- 
fully defined ideal" (p. 54). In his view the ideals of autonomy, rationality, and 
critical openness need to be modified. By introducing the neccessary qualifica- 
tions to the liberal assumptions, much of the sting of the charge of indoctrination 
against Christian nurture should be removed. When properly qualified, the prin- 
ciples of liberal education are compatible with a fairly orthodox version of 
Christianity: "What is being assumed here is the possibility of some shared con- 
victions and beliefs between Christians and non-Christians" (p. 55). There is 
some common ground between the two, including certain aspects of theories of 
liberal education and liberalism. Of course, Thiessen acknowledges, anti-liberal 
forces have always existed in the Christian church, and though he cannot vali- 
date the claim in his study, he suggests that these forces do not belong to main- 
stream Christian thought. 
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3. DOCTRINES AND NON-RATIONAL METHODS 
In order to refute the charge of indoctrination Thiessen discusses the criteria that 
are thought to define the concept of indoctrination: content (related to the scien- 
tific ideal), methods (related to the ideal of rationality), intention (related to the 
ideal of antonomy), and consequences (related to the ideal of critical openness). 
The upshot of Thiessen's analysis of doctrine (content) is that 'doctrines' as 
described by Kazepides, Wilson, Flew, Spiecker, and Gregory and Woods are 
also found in science, the paradigm of non-doctrine. By focusing on 'doctrines' 
and describing these as first-order principles, primary beliefs and epistemic pri- 
mitives and as being an essential part of all forms of knowledge, Thiessen loses 
sight of the fact that science and religion are quite different kinds of human enter- 
prises. In religion people try to find answers to the questions on the meaning of 
life, on their ultimate destination and origin, and how they should arrange their 
life accordingly. In religion no hypotheses are formulated or theories falsified. In 
science Thiessen's ocalled octrines will eventually be questioned and replaced 
by other first-order principles ('progressive paradigm-shift'). In most religions, 
and in Christianity as well, doctrines form the 'eternal hard-core'. Also the nature 
and the role of doctrines in Christian urture and in the initiation of students into 
science are quite different. Doctrines in religion often have the potential to pro- 
mote the development of intellectual vices and irrational feelings. In particular 
those beliefs which refer to the meanning of life, the ultimate or eternal destiny 
and origin of mankind and the final goal of history have enormous potential to 
arouse feelings of fear, guilt, despair and zealotry. It is hard to imagine how 
(often incomprehensible) formulae from nuclear physics or astronomy, which do 
not directly relate to the question meaning of our lives, can possibly give rise to 
such irrational feelings (Spiecker, 1991). 
With regard to religion, Thiessen capitalizes too much on the insights of the 
new philosophy of science. Surely, in a more philosophically defensible concep- 
tion of science the distinction between doctrines and non-doctrines has become 
somewhat blurred, but Thiessen's conclusions that both science and religion 
involve theoretical ttempts to understand the world, and that both are trying to 
make sense of (different aspects) of empirical reality (p. 84), are rather insignifi- 
cant. After all, the nature of these theoretical attempts are quite different. And 
when Thiessen states that "(O)rthodox Christianity is further firmly rooted in the 
empirical", thereby referring to John 1:1, 14 (p. 85), one cannot but have the 
impression that different language-games are being mixed up. The same applies 
to his claim that orthodox Christianity shares with science the principle of falli- 
bility. Here Thiessen is parting company with those Protestants and Catholics 
who explicitly or implicitly make claims to infallibility (p. 86). But what is the 
scope of this principle for an orthodox Christian? Lets me give an example. 
Recently, the Dutch-Reformed professor in theology and ethics Kuitert (1995) 
explained that Christianity has unjustly awarded the divine status to the histori- 
cal person Jesus, who literally was a scape-goat in his times. The exaggerated 
Christology has to be scaled down. Kuitert, so we could say, applies the prin- 
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ciple of fallibility to the heart of the Christian doctrine itseff. Now how is an 
orthodox Christian who endorses this principle to react to this view? Is she to 
acknowledge this view as a 'progressive shift', or is she to reject it because it is 
'degenerative'? (Knitert considers this shift as fruitful, because it will remove a 
doctrinal barrier between Jews, Muslims, and Christians.) Orthodox Christians, I 
assume, will rule out Kuitert's un-orthodox and 'revolutionary' interpretation, 
and if they do not reject his views then they are not orthodox Christians any 
more. In many respects religion is quite unlike science. Therefore, Thiessen's 
conclusion that "(I)f indoctrination is not inevitable when teaching scientific doc- 
trines, then it is not inevitable when teaching religious ones, because science and 
religion share many features" (p. 80, 81, see also: p. 86), needs to be questioned. 1 
In relation to the criterion of method Thiessen defends the obvious view that 
if indoctrination is defined in terms of non-rational teaching methods, then edu- 
cation and the initiation into forms of knowledge neccessarily involve indoctri- 
nation (p. 98). Here his analysis uffers from the fact that Thiessen discusses the 
criteria of indoctrination separately. After all, most philosophers do not consider 
one single condition as sufficient, apoint that he recognizes (p. 87, 117). Thiessen 
then explores the ideal of rationality itself that underlies the attempt to define 
indoctrination i terms of non-rational methods. Some of the central problems 
with the outdated (Enlightenment) account of rationality are outlined for the 
purpose of demonstrating that with a more defensible ideal of normal rationality, 
many of the challenges to religion and Christian nurture can be answered. 
Normal rationality recognizes that the justification of beliefs is a process con- 
ducted by human beings who have a psychology and a history. It is very con- 
scious of its subjectivity and fallibility. Thiessen's conclusion will not come as a 
surprise: "It is important to acknowledge the impossibility of measuring up to 
the ideal of rationality, both in science and religion, because there are limits to 
our being fully rational: we are finite, all justification must take certain things for 
granted, we have to rely on authority, and so forth. If despite these limitations, 
we deem scientific inquiry to be rational, then we must also classify religion as 
rational because science and religion are in fact very similar" (p. 110, 111). 
Therefore, according to Thiessen, the teaching of religion can be as rational (in 
the normal sense) as the teaching of science. 
Thiessen reminds us that this discussion is limited to orthodox Christianity, 
that is, to a cognitive approach of religion. But again I consider the comparison 
with science to be unfortunate. Think for example how moral education can be 
justified. From a prescriptivist (versus a emotivist) perspective on morality, for 
example, Hare has succeeded in demonstrating the rationality of morality as well 
as the logical differences between science and morality. 
4. AUTONOMY AND CRITICAL OPENNESS 
The favoured approach in defining indoctrination seems to be in terms of inten- 
tion. When parents intentionally hamper the development of the child's capacity 
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to live autonomously, they can be accused of indoctrination. Christian nurture is 
often understood as antithetical to autonomy for it does not aim at indepence, it 
teaches unshakable beliefs that are immune to evidence, and it aims at uncondi- 
tional obedience. 
Thiessen wants to give up the Englightenment ideal of autonomy and defend 
the ideal of normal autonomy. His defence draws on themes found in communi- 
tarian critiques of liberalism, critical theory, and post-modermist thinking. Normal 
autonomy is realistic with regard to the possibility of critical reflection because 
the letter is always tradition bound. An autonomous person can depend on others 
and trust them (forms of substantive dependence). All that is required for normal 
autonomy is that these commitments and relationships be entered into with some 
degree of freedom and deliberation (procedural independence) (p. 133). Now is 
Christian urture indoctrinatory in the sense of failing to promote growth towards 
normal autonomy? For Thiessen the Christian Scriptures upport he key ele- 
ments of normal autonomy. The argument that submission to God and the ideal 
of autonomy are incompatible r sts on a failure to distinguish between substan- 
tive and procedural independence: "Clearly Christianity advocates ubstantive 
dependence. But as long as people enter a relationship of commitment to God 
reflectively and from time to time reassess this commitment, hey satisfy the 
requirements of procedural independence and hence must be described as auto- 
nomous" (p. 138). If the ideal of normal autonomy is adopted then Christian 
nurture is compatible with the goal of fostering autonomy. Thiessen's argu- 
ments, however, are not convincing. The reassessment of an orthodox Christian 
finally comes down to (autonomously) deciding to give up his normal autonomy 
and rationality with regard to his commitment and he will accept God's revela- 
tion as authoritative. So with relation to this person's commitment it is probably 
more adequate to speak about a limited (normal) rationality and autonomy. 
I like to raise another point here. There are many different conceptions of 
Christian nurture and Thiessen should have elaborated the specific ('normal' or 
orthodox) conception of Christian upbringing he is defending. We then would 
have been in better position to agree or disagree with his statement that it is "a 
mistake to associate the provision of a relatively closed environment ofChristian 
homes and primary schools with indoctrination' (p. 143). After all, most of us 
are well acquainted with conceptions of Christian nurture that wilfuUy suppress 
autonomy, that intentionally promote feelings of irrational fear, guilt and despair. 
Up to now Thiessen has redefined the different aspects of the Enlightened i eal 
of liberal education. He surely would have rendered us a service if he had eluci- 
dated, from the perspective of his normal ideal of liberal education, what con- 
ceptions of Christian nurture could be called mentally unhealthy, authoritarian, 
anti-liberal, and undemocratic. 
Indoctrination is often defined in terms of consequences: the failure to pro- 
duce minds that are open and critical ('critical openness'). The ideal of critical 
openness, according to Thiessen, is confused, ambiguous, vague, and unrealistic. 
We are by nature finite, contingent and therefore our ability to be open and criti- 
cal is limited. A new concept ion of normal critical openness i needed (p. 155). 
286 BEN SPIECKER 
How is this capacity to be described? Displaying critical openness is to have a 
disposition to form and revise one's views in the light of evidence. It is character- 
ized by an ongoing willingness to assess traditions critically. And normal critical 
openness, o Thiessen stresses, clearly involves a rejection of blind faith in tradi- 
tion or authority (p. 164). The open-minded person is aware of this fallibility 
and displays such intellectual virtues as honesty, humility, courage and impar- 
tiality. And this ideal is not only compatible with Christian faith, but is in fact 
advocated by orthodox Christianity: "Open-mindedness is clearly a biblical 
ideal" (p. 166). 
Is Thiessen ot skirting the real issue?The very idea of absolute truth and of a 
revelation from God a authoritative seems to be incompatible with critical open- 
ness. Thiessen firmly rejects this view: "is this any different from a scientist who 
has opted for a certain theory to explain some phenomena and who then commits 
her- or himself to proving this theory for the remainder of her or his life?" (p. 
167). Here again the comparison with science fails. As I indicated before with 
relation to doctrines, speaking about 'theorizing', explaining' and 'proving' in 
the context of religion often causes unnecessary confusions. Despite my doubts 
with regard to his last line of reasoning, I tend to agree with Thiessen that critical 
openness is not necessarily incompatible with Christian faith. But whether the 
same applies to the orthodox-Christian faith is still an open question. 
5. THIESSEN'S CONCLUSIONS 
In this study two main lines of arguments can be distinguished. After having 
analyzed the criteria of indoctrination Thiessen concludes that the charge of 
religious indoctrination is less strong than generally assumed. In his analyses 
science and religion are continuously compared, and it is demonstrated that either 
science is in many ways as irrational as religion or that religion is as rational as 
science. As I have indicated before this first line of arguments i not too con- 
vincing. The second line of his defense is to show that it is logically possible for 
Christian nurture to meet the ideals of a more defensible form of liberal educa- 
tion. Here Thiessen's arguments are often illuminating. According to him it is 
possible for Christian parents and teachers to aim for both autonomy or critical 
openness and Christian urture. Christian upbringing does not necessarily involve 
indoctrination. But again the crucial question is: does this also apply to an ortho- 
dox Christian nurture? However, Thiessen's arguments simply do not justify the 
conclusion (or the empirical statement) hat "the probability of indoctrination i
Christian nurture is lower than is often assumed" (p. 210). 
One of Thiessen's main conclusions is that the concept of indoctrination is
unclear and that consequently the charge of religious indoctrination itself is con- 
fused. Therefore he makes it his task to reconstruct both this notion and the ideal 
of liberal education. Thiessen's objective is not to replace liberal ideal and values 
but to improve them (p. 215). His very brief reconstruction or rescriptive analy- 
ses of the assumptions underlying the ideal of liberal education actually comes 
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down to a summaly of the paradigm of the 'normal' ('normal rationality, auton- 
omy and critical openness'). One point in Thiessen's expose certainly deserves 
special attention. According to him, the contemporary ideal of liberal education 
is very much grounded in a naturalistic metaphysics. What he proposes in his 
reconstruction f the ideal of liberal education is "that we do not beg any meta- 
physical questions and that we therefore allow for the possibility of a broader 
metaphysics which acknowledges a transcendent reality. This is not at all to 
suggest hat liberal education must include initiation into a particular eligion. 
( . . . )  I am therefore calling on liberals to be true to their liberalism and to avoid 
making dogmatic assumptions in defining the metaphysics underlying the ideal 
of a liberal education" (p. 217). Here Thiessen touches on a issue that is of 
crucial importance in the conception of political iberalism as it is conceived by 
Rawls (1993). I will return to this subject later. 
How then is the ideal of liberal education to be reconstructed? For Thiessen 
socialization, which according to the primitive traditionalist approach is the heart 
of education, and the contemporary notions of liberal education must not be 
understood as two radically different concepts of liberal education, but rather as 
two equally important and necessary phases of a more inclusive concept of 
liberal education. In this two-phase approach the early transmissionlst compo- 
nent will be evaluated as a positive necessary dimension of becoming human. A 
stable and coherent 'primary culture' (Ackerman) is a precondition of a subse- 
quent development into autonomous liberal citizens. What is needed is a devel- 
opmental understanding of liberal education (p. 227, 232). 
This reconstruction f the ideal of liberal education ecessitates a redefinition 
of the notion of indoctrination. Thiessen acknowledges that his reconstruction is 
rather incomplete and that he therefore can only make some suggestions about 
how indoctrination might be understood best. It has been indicated that Thiessen 
does not take much interest in conceptual nalyses, and his "aim is not to present 
a careful analysis of the concept of indoctrination i  terms of logically necessary 
and sufficient conditions. ( . . . )  Given the theory-ladenness of language, it would 
seem more appropriate to aim for a "theory of indoctrination", rather than an 
analysis of the concept of indoctrination" (p. 232). Nevertheless, Thiessen 
comes up with suggestions that closely relate to past analyses of this concept, 
and he justifies this move by stating that '(G)iven the pervasiveness of the 
present understanding of "indoctrination", it would be unwise to propose too 
radical a reconstruction f the concept. . ."  (p. 233). (Thiessen has mixed feel- 
ings about analytic philosophy of education, but in my opinion it is precisely his 
analytical bent that makes this study worth reading.) The core idea of indoctrina- 
tion, so it is stated, is "the curtailment of a person's growth towards normal 
rational autonomy". This description also refers to growth toward normal ratio- 
nal autonomy, and therefore argues for a development view of indoctrination. 
Indoctrination is connected with the hampering of the development of the mind. 
(p. 234, 235). With this Thiessen agrees with those authors (Hare, Siegel) who 
stress the consequence riterion. He then spells out some valuable pedagogical 
consequences of this view and in this way sketches a first outline of a recon- 
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structed theory of indoctrination. One of these is that the development of the mind 
at its early stages requires initiation into, or the acquiring of a primary culture. 
What is also important is that the child acquires "a degree of procedural indepen- 
dence in making decision(s) of substantive dependence. Indoctrination stops 
growth towards such procedural independence and limited autonomy" (p. 237; 
in my opinion the terms 'degree' and 'limited' should have been omitted). Thiessen 
also points out that in the past too little attention was given to societal influences, 
like advertising and other influences of television, on the development of the mind. 
On the basis of his analyses Thiessen concludes that it is possible to avoid 
indoctrination i Christian nurture. Christian upbringing does not necessarily 
entail indoctrination. Despite the marginal notes that I have made, Thiessen has 
achieved the task he has set himself and that in general his rescriptive analyses 
are instructive. 
According to Thiessen his outline of a theory of indoctrination provides us 
with a sharp enough instrtunent to distinguish between true religious education 
and cases of indoctrination. So in the final chapter some practical implications 
and suggestions are presented. The Christian parent and teacher, as well as the 
Christian church and school, must boldly and openly initiate and socialize into 
the Christian tradition. Their goal should be both Christian commitment and normal 
autonomy. Where, so Thiessen emphasizes, the latter goal is missing, the charge 
of indoctrination is justified. Growth towards normal rational autonomy includes 
progress in understanding one's faith; for example, training children to give pat 
answers to pat question serves to be condemned (p. 260). Thiessen raises several 
debatable issues, for example, the statement that in Christian schools "forms of 
knowledge can and should be interpreted as a revelation of God's truth" (p. 267), 
but lack of space does not allow for further discussion of these matters. At any 
rate, the quote has a certain fundamentalist overtone. 
6. LIBERAL EDUCATION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 
One of the fundamental conclusions of his study, according to the author, is that 
it is a mistake to understand liberal education primarily in terms of liberation 
from the present and the particular (p. 273). Children need also to be nurtured 
into a conception of the present and the particular and therefore we need a plu- 
rality of schools. A truly liberal society allows for and supports avariety of edu- 
cational institutions, each committed to fostering rowth toward normal rational 
autonomy. Thiessen tentatively suggests that this educational pluralism is an 
implication of the arguments he presented in his study. But he rightly observes 
that many people will object that such a system of educational pluralism will 
only breed fanaticism and intolerance (p. 276). It is true that teaching for com- 
mitment does not necessarily imply the fostering of the mentioned perversions. 
But this reassurance alone simply will not do. Fanaticism and intolerance are 
central characteristics of fundamentalism and Thiessen should have dwelt longer 
on the question how in an orthodox Christian upbringing the risk of the develop- 
ment of a fundamentalist mentality can be prevented. 
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'Fundamentalism' can be described as the attitude of 'There are no open ques- 
t ions' (Beck and Merks, 1994). Absolute certainties are either dictated by the 
literal content of the bible or by the doctrinal authority of the mother-church. 
Protestant fundamentalism is characterized, among other things, by the absolute 
infallibility of the bible. The bible is the conclusive norm for all domains of life 
and offers the truth, not only with regard to issues of human salvation, but also 
with regard to scientific and historical data. The central feature of fundamental- 
ism is of course that one must stick to the traditional central truths of faith: the 
(substitute) Passion of Christ, the virginal birth and the resurrection of Christ. 
Consequently, fundamentalist ethics is marked by a conservative-regressive atti-
tude: human beings are sinners and there is only one salvation. And with that 
the domain of social ethics is often almost omitted (De Knijff, 1994). Though 
'(Christian) orthodoxy' and '(Christian) fundamentalism' are two different con- 
cepts, they certainly share some necessary conditions. Therefore, it looks to me 
that the main challenge for an orthodox Christian, who endorses a (reconstructed) 
idea~ of liberal education, is to indicate how in Christian nurture the teaching for 
commitment does not necessarily imply the promotion of a fundamentalist men- 
tality. I myself am not in the position to come up with an outline of an answer. 
Instead I shall approach this issue from a different perspective and rephrase the 
challenge. 
Western liberal democracies are pluralistic societies. Thiessen acknowledges 
that in liberal democracies there is common ground between Christians and non- 
Christians. In this context Rawls speaks about overlapping consensus. Implicit 
in the public political culture of liberal democracies i the shared fundamental 
intuitive idea "of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and 
equal persons" (Rawls, 1993, p. 9). Citizens in our society, being free and equal 
persons, are regarded as having a determinate conception of the good, as having 
a relatively encompassing conception of the meaning, value and purpose of 
life. Secondly, citizens are supposed to have a capacity for a conception of the 
good, that is to say, the capacity of developing such a conception, of pursuing it 
rationally, and of revising and changing their conception on reasonable and 
rational grounds. A third and last quality of citizens consists of a complex capac- 
ity for a sense of justice. From the above we can cautiously conclude that reli- 
gious nurture in a liberal democracy should never go against or undermine the 
common ground of our public political culture. This common ground does not 
comprise, and I quote Thiessen, "dogmatic assumptions in defining the meta- 
physics underlying the ideal of a liberal education" (p. 217). Without an overlap- 
ping consensus our societies will soon fall into a 'religious balkanization'. As 
we have seen, the suppression of the capacity for a conception of the good can 
be called indoctrination, and it is in the interest of the state to pay special atten- 
tion to schools, in particular, that religious nurture does not violate the right of 
the child (as a future citizen) to develop this capacity. 
But, according to Rawls, our role of citizen also implies that we have a deter- 
minate conception of the good. In a liberal democracy parents also have the duty 
to help and support he child to develop his (personal) conception of the good. 
Because a liberal democracy is characterized by a relatively thin or small moral- 
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ity, in particular by the basic liberties (freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
etc.), it leaves much 'flee space' to develop and pursue different conceptions of 
the good. 2But this also implies that this liberal framework indicates, as it were, 
the limits within which practising conceptions of the good is allowed. To use the 
words of Rawls: 'the Right' has priority over 'the Good' (Spiecker and Steutel, 
1995). Let me give an example. In some families in The Netherlands values are 
transmitted that conflict with the liberal principle of justice. I have in mind 
particularly those families in which a strict-orthodox r a fundamentalist religion 
is imparted to children. In these families it is not unusual that the separation 
between church and state (or mosque) is rejected, which is contrary to the princi- 
ples of freedom of religion or liberty of conscience. And in these circles women 
are sometimes denied certain political rights. For example, quite recently the 
general committee of the Dutch Reformed Political Party proposed a motion in 
which women were denied membership of their party. According to the commit- 
tee, party-membership of women had to be considered a violation of biblical 
texts. They claim that the bible says that the 'office of ruler' is reserved for men 
only. In a private meeting of the party, in September 1993, the motion was 
carried. This decision led to considerable national and international uproar. Parents 
who transmit such religious-moral doctrines offer their children a religious and 
moral nurture that clearly conflicts with basic liberal rights. According to Macedo, 
liberal justice exerts the positive requirement that every citizen's 'good' includes 
certain features, including a willingness to respect he equal freedom of others, 
commitments o impartial rules of law, and to persuade rather than coerce: 
"Liberal justice could not be affirmed by a Protestant who believes he should 
fight to the death rather than live in peace with Catholics, and it could not be 
acknowledged as morally supreme by a citizen prepared to advance his interests 
through political means at the expense of the rights of others" (1992, p. 213). 
I can now rephrase the challenge that I formulated for the orthodox Christian 
('Is it possible to teach for Christian commitment without promoting a funda- 
mentalist mentality'): in teaching for orthodox Christian commitment, the bounds 
of our common ground are not to be exceeded and our thin liberal morality should 
not be undermined. After all, a distinctive feature of a fundamentalist i  that he 
or she has not acquired the liberal virtues, like tolerance, broad sympathies, and 
an altruistic regard for one's fellow liberal citizens. And so the central question 
remains: can an orthodox Christian ever be a liberal Christian at the same time? 
Thiessen, so I assume, will take this challenge seriously, for his study also 
demonstrates a deep commitment to (a conception of) liberal education. 
NOTES 
i According to Cart "But surely ought to be considered a quite unacceptable high price to pay for 
the defence of refigious enquiry as a valid pathway to human knowledged to call into question the 
objectivity ofthose forms of natural science investigation which have standardly been regarded asso 
successful with respect to the explanation a d understanding of just such an order of independent 
objective r ality?" (1994, p. 224). 
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2 Some of the basic ideas of political iberalism are succinctly summarized by Moon: "The basic 
answer that political iberalism gives to the question of pluralism is to limit the authority of the state 
to a distinct "public" sphere in which a person's activities necessarily impinge directly upon others. 
Within that sphere, relations must be governed by principles that everyone can accept; beyond it, 
people are free to direct their lives as they wish. ( . . . )  In a political community whose scope is 
limited in this way, "space" is created within which people can follow diverse values and interests 
(Moon, 1994, p. 36, 37). 
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Fanaticism and Christian Liberal Education: A Response 
to Ben Spiecker's "Commitment o Liberal Education ''l 
ELMER JOHN THIESSEN 
Ilumanities Department, Medicine Hat College 
Ben Spiecker and I are roughly in agreement as to what indoctrination means. 
Spiecker defines indoctrination i terms of the suppression of the disposition for 
critical reflection (p. 288; Spiecker, 1991). I define indoctrination as 'the curtail- 
ment of a person's growth towards normal rational autonomy' (p. 233). My notion 
of normal rational autonomy includes the ideal of critical openness and I too 
prefer to think of this ideal in terms of attitudes and dispositions rather than in 
epistemic terms (pp. l18f, 148f, 160, 163-8, 236, 240). Spiecker correctly senses 
that I have a deep commitment to the ideals of liberalism and liberal education 
(though with proper qualifications), and hence I am as opposed to indoctrination, 
fanaticism and intolerance as he is. 
There are two important differences in our understanding of indoctrination, 
however. Spiecker finds it unnecessary toqualify the ideal of rational autonomy 
with the adjective 'normal,' a qualification which is essential to my analysis. He 
fails to appreciate why we can achieve only a limited degree of autonomy and 
independence (p. 288). Communitarians and postmodemists have taught us that 
the liberal ideal of rational autonomy arising out of the Enlightenment is fun- 
damentally flawed, as I argue at length in my book. Here we must be careful, 
though, not to carry the critique to an extreme, but instead seek a reconciliation 
between modernism and postmodernism, between individualism and communi- 
tarianism (54, 215, 293n5). My qualification of "normal" to the ideal of rational 
autonomy is based on such a reconciliation. 
Spiecker and I also differ with regard to the content criterion of indoctrination. 
Spiecker wishes to retain a connection between indoctrination and doctrines, 
which then leads him to draw the commonly made conclusion that indoctrina- 
tion typically occurs in religion, but not in science. One underlying problem here 
is that Spiecker adopts a non-cognitivist approach to religion which I reject for 
reasons which cannot be reviewed here. Orthodox Christianity is profoundly 
theoretical nd empirical, and it simply will not do for Spiecker to suggest that 
"different language-games are being mixed up," when I make such a claim 
(p. 283). Such a criticism rests on a very particular interpretation f religion in 
accordance with the gospel of Wittgenstein, who can hardly be classified as an 
orthodox theologian. Of course Spiecker may prefer a Wittgensteinian pproach 
to Christianity, but to use this "fallible" interpretation f Christianity to object o 
an orthodox interpretation (admittedly fallible) is to beg the question. I refer the 
reader to my book for some of my reasons for rejecting a non-theoretical, non- 
empirical interpretation f Christianity (pp. 83 -4). 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 15: 293-300, 1996. 
9 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
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Spiecker also tends to treat science as an idealized abstraction, a tendency 
which I specifically critique in my book (pp. 81-3). In the end, science is prac- 
ticed by scientists. And scientists, as persons, can be (and often are) as dogmatic 
as some adherents to religion - dogmatism is one feature often associated with 
doctrines (p. 64). And there are in science basic presuppositions or epistemic 
primitives - a feature which I consider to be definitive of doctrines (p. 78). These 
presuppositions are often not held up to critical scrutiny by scientists, or by, the all 
too often, gullible public that has been indoctrinated in science and into the reli- 
gion of scientism, thanks to the dominant Weltanschauung of Western societies. 
Here it is important to focus on the basic presuppositions of science, not on 
"the formulae from nuclear physics or astronomy" which obviously don't concern 
the meaning of life or give rise to irrational feelings (Spiecker, 1996, p. 283). 
Obviously formulae in science are not doctrines. Formulae grow out of theories 
which ultimately rest on basic presuppositions about the nature of reality. And 
interestingly (and sadly), it is at this deeper level of science that scientists do 
often become quite irrational - one has only to think of the zealotry behind the 
promotion of the speculative doctrines of macro-evolutionary theory! And such 
doctrines have profound implications for the meaning of fife. 
There is however one difference between the doctrines of science and the 
doctrines of religion which Spiecker frequently alludes to, and which I failed to 
address pecifically in my book - the doctrines of religion are based on revela- 
tion (pp. 283, 286, 289). Clearly, the doctrines of science do not rest on a 
divinely inspired revelation (though it needs to be stressed that there are gurus in 
science whose writings seem to be given this lofty status by the public). Now the 
question of revelation clearly raises some new and interesting philosophical 
questions which can only be dealt with very briefly in this paper. Here it should 
at least be noted that there have been some sophisticated philosophical defenses 
of the possibility of divine revelation, as well as of criteria to use in assessing 
such a revelation (see Mavrodes, 1988; Abraham, 1981: Swinburne, 1981, ch. 7). 
There are two key questions that need to be addressed with regard to revelation. 
How does a believer come to accept he doctrines of revelation in the first place? 
This need not be an irrational or non-critical process, but can be carried out in such 
a way as to satisfy the criteria of procedural independence, which are essential to 
autonomy (Thiessen, 1993, p. 133). Second, it is most important to distingttish bet- 
ween revealed truth, and the human understanding of revealed truth, a distinction 
which runs parallel to a "secular" distinction between absolute truth and the 
human search for and grasp of absolute truth (see my quote from James, p. 108). 
The latter is fallible, as is the human understanding of revealed truth (p. 138). 
Any normal thinking Christian will on occasion have doubts as to what she 
believes, and will from time to time raise questions about even the central tenets 
of the Christian faith. Of course, if as Spiecker notes (p. 283f), these doubts and 
questions eventually lead a person to challenge some basic tenets of Christian 
belief, such as the divine status of Jesus, then that person is no longer an ortho- 
dox Christian. But this is just a matter of classification. A so called "Newtonian 
scientist" who challenges the law of gravity is no longer an orthodox Newtonian 
either. We must allow a school of thought to define its own orthodoxy. 
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Clearly, there are some differences between the doctrines of religion and the 
doctrines of science. But to limit the meaning of "doctrines" to features which 
are unique to religion is arbitrary. It would further be inadvisable to define "doc- 
trine" in terms of beliefs acquired by revelation because it is generally recognized 
that political beliefs also are susceptible to indoctrination and these obviously 
are not based on divine revelation (cf. Thiessen, 1993, p. 76). 
My central argument of chapter 3 therefore still stands - doctrines, defined as 
the basic presuppositions of a belief system, which are not directly verifiable or 
falsifiable, and which are broad in scope and of central importance to that belief 
system - such doctrines are found in science as well as in religion (p. 78). Even 
Spiecker is forced to admit that the distinction between doctrines and non-doc- 
trines has become blurred in a more philosophically defensible conception of 
science (p. 283). 
The above problem touches on Spiecker's primary worry about my position -
the slide towards fundamentalism. "Is it possible to teach for Christian commit- 
raent without promoting a fundamentalist mentality" (p. 290)? Is Christian urture 
compatible with such liberal virtues like "tolerance, broad sympathies, a will- 
ingness to experience, and an altrustic regard for one's fellow liberal citizens" 
(p. 290)7 
Here we need to put aside one possible interpretation of this challenge which 
would make it impossible and futile to attempt an answer. It might be argued 
that Christian nurture is logically incompatible with liberal values. Orthodox 
C.hristianity is then by definition illiberal. I do not think that Spiecker wants to 
frame the challenge in this way - he admits, for example that a system of educa- 
tional pluralism with schools teaching for commitment would not necessarily 
imply the fostering of such perversions as fanaticism and intolerance (p. 288). 
But not all writers are as careful as Spiecker, and hence I draw attention to the 
danger of ruling out, by arbitrary definition, the very possibility of a reconcilia- 
tion between Christian nurture and the ideals of liberalism and liberal education. 
The term "fundamentalism" obviously carries very pejorative overtones for 
Spiecker, as it does for many people today. Emotionally laden terms call for special 
caution and here again we must beware of arbitrary definitons. Unfortunately, 
Spiecker fails to distinguish clearly between orthodox Christianity and funda- 
mentalism, saying only that "they share some necessary conditions" (pp. 289). 
One central meaning of fundamentalism is that one must "stick" to the funda- 
mentals - a Christian fundamentalist must therefore adhere to the traditional 
central truths of the faith, e.g., the substitute passion of Christ, the virgin birth, 
the resurrection of Christ (p. 289). Clearly this is part of what it also means to be 
an orthodox Christian - though a lot hinges on how one sticks to these funda- 
mentals. 
Let me respond here to Spiecker's quite legitimate reminder that Christianity 
is not all of one piece and that I therefore need to identify more clearly where I
would place myself on the theological spectrum (p. 282). Although I adhere to the 
fundamental tenets of the Christian faith, I would want to stress the importance 
of "sticking" to these fundamentals in a rational, openminded manner, humbly 
296 ELMER J. THIESSEN 
acknowledging that I may be wrong, and respecting those who differ from me. It 
was never my intent to defend an unthinking and closed-minded approach to 
Christian nurture which leads to fanaticism and intolerance. As an evangelical 
Christian, I share with fundamentalism the acceptance of the basic doctrines of 
the Christian faith, but I would distance myself rom unthinking, narrow-minded, 
and intolerant attitudes often associated with fundamentalism. 2 
I would argue that believing in certain fundamental doctrines cannot in itself 
be considered suspect or be seen as the source of the pejorative overtones inher- 
ent in the term fundamentalism. Every school of thought, even in the sciences, 
can be defined in terms of certain fundamentals (e.g., quantum theory, behav- 
iourism). And it is no accident hat Spiecker describes liberal democracies as 
sharing a "fundamental intuitive idea" of societies as needing to be characterized 
by fairness, justice and equality (p. 289). 
Part of Spiecker's concerns with Christian fundamentalism (and orthodox 
Christianity) would seem to be that he simply disagrees with some of the funda- 
mentals, e.g., he sees some doctrines of Christianity, such as the doctrine of sin, as 
giving rise to "feelings of irrational fear, guilt and despair" (p. 285; cf. pp. 283, 
289). But what makes guilt irrational? And who defines what is irrational? The 
question raised by Maclntyre in the title of his book, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? is most appropriate here (1988). Clearly for orthodox Christians, 
feeling guilty before a God who will someday hold us accountable for our 
actions is not at all irrational. One may disagree with this, but liberals, according 
to Rawls must accept the "burdens of judgement," allowing that reasonable 
persons may affirm differing reasonable doctrines (1993, pp. 12-3). 
Another aspect of Spiecker's concerns about fundamentalism has to do with 
the source of these fundamentals. Obviously revelation plays a key role in defin- 
ing the fundamentals of Christianity. But an appeal to divine revelation should 
not in itself be seen as a ground for holding fundamentalism (and orthodox 
Christianity) suspect, as I have already argued. Rational and critical approaches 
to revelation are quite in keeping with the evangelical version of Christianity 
with which I identify. 
This is not to say that there are some very immature attitudes towards the 
bible on the part of some Christians. I agree that some Christians go too far in 
stressing the literal truth of the bible, failing to appreciate the complexity of bib- 
lical language, with its use of metaphor and poetry, but such naivity is not a 
necessary characteristic of orthodox Christianity. I have already dealt with the 
problems inherent in talk about the bible as providing "absolute certainties." 
Christians have only a finite and fallible understanding of what God has revealed 
in the bible. We may of course use the label " fundamentalism"to refer to these 
distorted and naive attitudes to the bible, but we must be careful not to paint 
orthodox Christianity with the same brush - a tendency of Spiecker's (p. 289). 
The same point needs to be made about he risk of fanaticism and intolerance, 
two other characteristics which Spiecker associates with fundamentalism (p.288). 
I too agree that fanaticism and intolerance are evils, but orthodox Christianity 
and Christian nurture are not in and of themselves fanatical and intolerant, un- 
less one again makes the association by arbitrary definition. 
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One of the problems that we face here concerns the definition of "intoler- 
ance." Misconceptions about intolerance abound in the modernist/liberal world- 
view (Newman, 1982; Thiessen, 1987). It is often assumed, for example, that the 
exclusivism of orthodox Christianity is by its very nature intolerant. Spiecker 
seems to fall prey to this misconception when he objects to fundamentalist claims 
that "there is only one salvation," and when he stresses the need for "broad sym- 
pathies" (pp. 289, 290). 
I would argue, however, that any truth claims are by their very nature xclusive. 
Spiecker himself makes an exclusive claim when he condemns fundamentalists 
- they are wrong and he is right. His Wittgensteinian i terpretation of religious 
language is again a very particular exclusivist position, which leads him to reject 
an orthodox interpretation of Christianity as mistaken. A liberal theological 
position might sound more tolerant, but we must not be misled by appearances. 
A refusal to allow orthodoxy to define itself displays a profound lack of respect 
and tolerance which is unfortunately all too common among liberal theologians, 
as well as among those who defend liberalism generally. 
What is needed is a proper understanding of the ideal of tolerance which allows 
one to have convictions, even strong convictions, which will inevitably lead to 
disagreement with others. But having strong convictions can still be combined 
with a love for and an appreciation of people who differ. Protestants with strong 
convictions can, and should, live in peace with Catholics, and vice versa 
(cf. Spiecker, 1996, p. 290). To fail to do so is not only to fail to be tolerant, but 
it is also a failure to follow the injunctions of orthodox Christianity. 
The cure for intolerance is not found in a relativistic elimination of convic- 
tions, but in a sensitive approach to liberal education which combines teaching 
for commitment with the encouragement of respect for others who differ, and an 
awareness of human fallibility and finiteness. This, I believe is possible in ortho- 
dox Christian liberal education. After all, few will dispute the fact that Jesus 
combined the making of exclusive claims with an attitude of tolerance (cf. Luke 
9:5, 51-56). True, he was most intolerant with religious self-righteousness, but 
there are limits to tolerance, as most liberals recognize. 
Religious commitment also should not be confused with religious fanaticism. 
Paul specifically warns against he danger of religious commitment leading to 
dangerous fanaticism. This can occur if commitment isn't accompanied by reflec- 
tion. "For I can testify about hem that they are zealous for God, but their zeal is 
not based on knowledge" (Romans 10:2). All too often, fears about breeding 
fanaticism and intolerance are based on a failure to distinguish these evils from 
normal conviction and commitment. The former are perversions of healthy com- 
mitment, as has been so ably argued by Jay Newman (1986). It is true that teach- 
ing for commitment can foster these perversions, but it need not. And we must 
not let the fear of such perversions make us miss out on the benefits of healthy 
commitment. Love has its perversions too, but we do not let this stop us from 
praising the virtues of love. 
It is time to focus on the liberal portion of Spiecker's fundamentalist/liberal 
dichotomy. Can an orthodox Christian ever be a liberal Christian at the same 
time (p. 290)? Is it possible to teach for commitment while at the same time 
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upholding the ideal of liberal education? It all depends on what is meant by a 
liberal Christian, or by liberal education. If a liberal Christian is defined in terms 
of not making exclusive claims, then it is impossible for an orthodox Christian 
to be a liberal Christian. But this is an arbitrary definition. 
A major thrust of my book is to examine carefully some of the typical iberal 
virtues such as rationality, open-mindedness and autonomy. I argue that there are 
problems with the way in which these virtues are typically defined by liberals. I
therefore introduce some important qualifications to these virtues - and hence 
the preface "normal" before each of these liberal virtues. Rationality needs to be 
defined so as to recognise its limits - it is always to some extent radition bound. 
Open-mindedness cannot mean empty-mindedness. The individuality inherent in 
the liberal ideal of autonomy needs to be balanced with an emphasis on commu- 
nity, and it needs to be recognized that no human being is completely indepen- 
dent from others. Once these liberal virtues are properly qualified so as to be 
more coherent and philosophically defensible, then - yes - orthodox Christians 
can be liberal Christians. 
The same approach needs to be taken with regard to liberal education. If liberal 
education is seen as precluding teaching for commitment, or if the initiation into 
a present and a particular (e.g., orthodox Christianity) is viewed as inherently 
suspect, then again the two ideals are logically inconsistent. But, a major thrust 
of my book is to argue that today's reigning paradigm of liberal education, which 
views the initiation into a present and a particular with suspicion, is fundamen- 
tally flawed. Nurture is the necessary cradle of liberal education (p. 225). What 
is needed is a major reconstruction of the contemporary ideal of liberal educa- 
tion so as to see initiation and liberation as two equally important and comple- 
mentary phases of a good liberal education (see my ch. 8). Once this revised and 
more defensible ideal of liberal eductaion is in place, then again, orthodox Christian 
nurture is compatible with liberal education. The basic conclusion of my book 
therefore still stands, contrary to Spiecker (p. 286) - the charge of indoctrination 
is less strong than is generally assumed because the charge is typically based on 
a misconception of the ideal of liberal education that fails to see nurture as a 
necessary and foundational ingredient of a liberal education (p. 210). 
Spiecker suggests that I need to elucidate, from this perspective of a revised 
and normal ideal of liberal education, "what conceptions of Christian umtre could 
be called mentally unhealthy, authoritarian, anti-liberal and undemocratic" (p. 285). 
I do this in the final chapter of my book, but let me provide a quick review. 
Unhealthy Christian noaXure fails to have as its goal, the freeing of the child to 
make an "independent" choice for or against Christian commitment - though, here 
we must be careful to acknowledge that we are not quite as independent as is typi- 
cally assumed by liberals (p. 255). Unhealthy Christian nurture "forces" children 
to become Christians via the practice of infant baptism and "automatic" confirma- 
tion, thereby discouraging rowth towards normal rational autonomy (p. 259). It 
also fails to cultivate a rational grounding for Christian convictions (p. 263). 
It fails to encourage children and students to grapple with the questions that ine- 
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vitably arise with regard to the faith in which they are being brought up (p. 263). 
It fails to expose the maturing child to alternate belief systems and other religions 
(p. 266). It fails to teach students to respect people who are committed 
to other woddviews. It fails to encourage curiousity and the broadening of hori- 
zons. Finally, in Constanfinian fashion, it uses a state-supported system of educa- 
tion to impose Christian beliefs and values on all students regardless of their 
individual upbringings (p. 12). Such failures deserve to be labelled indoctrinatory. 
But, having said all this, it needs to be stressed that I would at the same time 
want to emphasize the legitimacy of boldly teaching for Christian commitment 
in Christian homes and Christian schools (pp. 244, 250). But this needs to be 
done in such a way as to cultivate the "normal" liberal virtues described above. 
And such nurture will not lead to fanaticism, intolerance and closed-mindedness. 
In the end, I suspect Spiecker will not be satisfied with my description of Chris- 
fian liberal education. He will argue that I am simply not liberal enough, and that 
my version of Christian nurture will in fact lead to fanaticism and intolerance. Is
there then a way to resolve our residual differences? I suspect not. Spiecker's 
version of the values that are necessary for a liberal democracy are still too thick. 
Rawls, in his latest version of liberalism is trying to avoid the imposition of 
some general moral doctrine, such as Kantian autonomy on the diverse subjects 
of a pluralistic democracy (1993). Instead, he tries to locate a family of political 
values within an overlapping consensus among all extant ethical views held by 
reasonable citizens (Rawls, 1993, pp. l l -22,  63-4). The rub, of course is, who is 
classified as a reasonable citizen? I believe that orthodox Christians can be ratio- 
nal, open-minded, critical, broad-minded, and tolerant. Indeed, their Christian 
beliefs call them to display these characteristics, asI point out in various places 
in my book. And Christian nurture should boldly seek to inculcate a healthy 
commitment tosuch normal iberal values. 
What do we do with those Christians (and other religious fundamentalists, 
including dogmatic liberals) who go beyond orthodoxy, and want to teach values 
which will lead to narrowness, fanaticism and intolerance? This is a central 
problem which has haunted the liberal tradition since its inception. It is quite 
beyond the scope of this paper to address this problem, except o suggest hat 
there is a desparate need to set aside the strong reaction to any sort of religious 
commitment which modern liberalism has inherited from the Enlightenment, 
and to appreciate the importance of, and perhaps even the need for, some sort 
of healthy religious commitment among the citizens within a liberal pluralis- 
tic democracy. Rawls is struggling with a redefinition of liberalism which would 
accomodate orthodox religious commitment, but he still has some way to go in 
order to bring about a full reconciliation (see Jackson, 1991). Spiecker too is in 
danger of imposing liberal orthodoxy on orthodox Christians and thereby becom- 
ing illiberal. 
I am indebted to Spiecker for his most careful review of my book and for 
quite legitimately pushing me to clarify the nature of a Christian liberal educa- 
tion which does not lead to religious fanaticism. 
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NOTES 
1 Where the context clearly refers to my book (Thiessen, 1993), or to Spiecker's review of my book 
(Spiecker, 1996), I will simply provide page references tothese sources. 
2 For an excellent academic treatment of the distinction between fundamentalism and evangelical- 
ism, see Marsden (1987). 
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